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Abstract
Can we sensibly attribute some of the happenings in our world to
the agency of some of the things around us? We do this all the
time, but there are conceptual challenges purporting to show that
attributable agency, and specifically one of its most important
subspecies, human free agency, is incoherent. We address these
challenges in a novel way: Rather than merely rebutting specific
∗Institut für Theoretische Physik, Universität Innsbruck, Technikerstraße 25,
A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria, and Institut für Quantenoptik und Quanteninforma-
tion der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Innsbruck, Austria; email:
hans.briegel@uibk.ac.at.
†Fachbereich Philosophie, Universität Konstanz, Fach 17, 78457 Konstanz, Germany;
email: Thomas.Mueller@uni-konstanz.de.
‡This paper is fully collaborative; authors are listed alphabetically. Copyright by the
authors.
1
Briegel & Müller, A chance for attributable agency, Preprint 24 Feb. 2014
arguments, we discuss a concrete model that we claim positively
illustrates attributable agency in an indeterministic setting. The
model, recently introduced by one of the authors in the context
of artificial intelligence, shows that an agent with a sufficiently
complex memory organization can employ indeterministic hap-
penings in a meaningful way. We claim that these considerations
successfully counter arguments against the coherence of libertar-
ian (indeterminism-based) free will.
1 Introduction
We are part of a world that contains agents : things that react to environ-
mental stimuli in flexible yet sensible ways, and to whose active powers we
attribute many of the happenings around us. We ourselves, human beings,
are prime examples of such agents, but we ascribe agency much more widely;
in fact, to most if not all animals, and to some artifacts like robots that we
made ourselves. The cat pushed the book off the table, Sue went to London,
the bug hid under a leaf, my mobile phone told me to turn left, the dog
ate my homework. These are ordinary ways of thinking and talking, and
while there are certainly some borderline cases or reasons to correct some
of our attributions of agency in the light of further considerations, it seems
outrageous to assume that none of these attributions are warranted. Yet, the
notion of attributable agency is conceptually problematic in a way that casts
doubt on its coherence.1 Most of the discussion of these problems is directed
at a specific case of attributable agency, human free will as the basis for the
moral attribution of actions—but as we will show, the conceptual problems
are much more general, and more basic than that. We lay out these problems
and set them in a general context in §2. In §3 we describe an indeterministic
model, recently introduced by one of the authors in the context of artificial
intelligence (Briegel and De las Cuevas, 2012; Briegel, 2012), that we claim
successfully meets the conceptual challenges of attributable agency. We dis-
cuss this model and its implications in §4, and we draw some conclusions in
§5.
1Since the terms “action” and “agency” are used in many different ways, we use the
explicit phrase “attributable agency” to stress that our topic is agency that can be at-
tributed to an agent as an agent. Not all physical movements of an agent’s body are thus
attributable.
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2 The problem of attributable agency
As we said, attributable agency—the agency of concrete agents such as
animals—is all around us; how could that be problematic? The problem,
generally speaking, comes from trying to understand an agent and its ac-
tions as part of the natural order of things that is the subject of scientific
investigation. It is a problem, one could say, of bringing together the two
views on our world that Sellars (1963) called the “manifest” and the “scientific
image of man”, and as such, a core problem of philosophy.
2.1 The agency dilemma
For concreteness, let us consider a would-be agent, α (some actually exist-
ing, persisting thing, e.g., the cat), and some actual past event, e, occurring
at te (such as the change of a property of a persisting thing, e.g., the book
falling off the table). Under which conditions could it be warranted to at-
tribute e to α? (When would it make sense to say that the book’s fall is
due to the cat?) We would normally take this question to concern specific
details of the situation. (Normally, if the cat touched the book and it fell,
the fall was due to the cat, but not if, e.g., you pushed her against the book.)
But the following dilemma seems to show that such attribution can never
be warranted. That dilemma’s usual habitat is the free will debate, and
we will draw some connections to that debate and its well-entrenched ter-
minology, but the dilemma applies much more widely, and in fact threatens
to undermine not just the complex and controversial notion of human free
will, but what is, quite uncontroversially, one of its necessary preconditions:
attributable agency in general.
The two horns of our dilemma follow a major watershed in metaphysics.
Given the actual situation s at some time ts before the occurrence of e, it is
either the case that (a) the only possibility for te was that e occurs, or (b) it
was possible that at te, e does not occur. More generally, either (a) the world
is deterministic, such that at any time, there is exactly one possible future
course of events, or (b) the world is indeterministic, i.e., not deterministic:
at some times, there is more than one possibility for what will happen in the
future.2
2A world could be indeterministic in the sense just introduced, and yet such that given
s at ts, only e could happen at te—such a world would be locally deterministic with respect
to ts and te. We will ignore this complication in what follows, and take indeterminism to
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Consider the deterministic horn first: Does attributable agency make
sense under the assumption of determinism? This is an extremely contro-
versial subject, on which much ink has been spilt. So-called compatibilists
with respect to free will have devised various ways of making sense of the
idea: Even when facing a deterministic toy world (such as the world of Con-
way’s game of Life that figures prominently in Dennett (2003)), we can adopt
a stance according to which we can describe what goes on in terms of at-
tributable agency. On the other hand, there is the powerful intuition that if
in the real world, given s at ts (which can be the situation thousands of years
before our would-be agent α is born), it is fixed that e will occur at te, then
α can’t really have anything decisive to do with e, and any attribution of
agency will have to be by courtesy only. In fact, in the deterministic setting,
it seems hard to ascribe to α an identity as an agent. Of course, α’s body
is causally involved in what happens, like a cogwheel in a machine, but α
makes no real difference to what is going on: e is not due to the agent, and
thus cannot be attributed to α. This strong intuition has been formalized
as the so-called “consequence argument” by Van Inwagen (1983), who glosses
his argument as follows:
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the
laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up
to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up
to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences
of those things (including our present acts) are not up to us.
(Van Inwagen, 1983, v)
This argument is considered a major problem for compatibilism. We hold
that the deterministic horn of the dilemma indeed rules out attributable
agency in our concrete world, for two reasons: (i) we have not yet seen a
successful rebuttal of the consequence argument in the literature, and (ii)
we have excellent reasons—the best scientific reasons we can have for any
metaphysical belief, in fact—to believe that our world is deeply indetermin-
istic, so that even if a compatibilist notion of attributable agency could be
defended, that notion would not pertain to our world, and would thereby be
useless.3
Since the issue is so controversial, let us add three remarks. First, many
compatibilists are avowedly science-friendly (“naturalists”), and do at least
imply different possibilities at te, given s at ts.
3For a similar assessment, see Steward (2012).
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acknowledge quantum indeterminism. Reactions to this are divided. Some
compatibilists explicitly proclaim to be agnostic as to the determinism or
indeterminism of our world.4 Such compatibilists however often go on to
focus on the deterministic option only, ignoring the challenge to develop a
sensible notion of attributable agency under indeterminism. This strategy
relies on the idea that whatever randomness there is in the world, it will only
be a small disturbance on top of an otherwise deterministic course of events.
But this is fallacious. Of course we wouldn’t even know about quantum
randomness if it didn’t sometimes make a macroscopic difference that we
can perceive.5 A true agnostic, who allows for concrete actions of an agent
to be undetermined, has to face a double task: to develop a sensible notion of
attributable agency under determinism, and to develop such a notion under
significant indeterminism. In so far as we proclaim to take up the latter task
only, our aim is in fact strictly narrower than that of the serious agnostic.
You can’t be an agnostic compatibilist and blame the libertarians for not
having done their job. If you blame the libertarian, this shows that your
agnosticism is just a variant of deterministic compatibilism that allows for a
little insignificant random noise, and as such, is open to empirical refutation.
Second, other compatibilists argue that no matter quantum indeterminism, at
the level of the brain, determinism reigns. It is true that individual neurons do
not show the indeterministic behavior of a photon hitting a beam splitter—
they show a fairly regular behavior. But it is fallacious to argue from this to
determinism of the brain. Never mind the stochastic behavior of individual
neurons—the brain is an open system, and indeterminism in the environment
can make a perceptible and also a behavioral difference to an agent (think of
4See, e.g., Fischer and Ravizza (1998, 253f.), where the authors stress that the truth or
falsity of determinism is a scientific issue and argue that while their position is compatible
with determinism, it is also consistent with some forms of indeterminism.
5The discussion given by Fischer and Ravizza (1998, 253) is telling: “[. . .] the conditions
on taking responsibility [. . .] appear to be straightforwardly consistent with the truth of
certain sorts of indeterminism. Now this is not to say that these conditions are consistent
with all kinds of indeterminism. The conditions would not seem to be satisfied in a world
in which there is a significant kind of randomness at the macroscopic level. [. . .] But, of
course, this is no objection to our theory, as everyone would, presumably, deny that an
individual has control of the sort required for moral responsibility in a random world.”
Never mind the focus on moral responsibility in this quote. The idea seems to be that if
an agent’s action is really undetermined, then we cannot attribute it any more. But this is
then no longer an agnostic position—it relies on the false assumption that all randomness
is restricted to a micro-level. Our indeterministic world is not like that.
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hearing a Geiger counter click). Third, it appears that many compatibilists,
when pressed, do agree that we are initially inclined to want a notion of
attributable agency that is connected with an open future and thus, with
indeterminism. A common reaction on the compatibilist side is, however,
to argue that since no sensible notion of attributable agency—or freedom—
under indeterminism seems to be forthcoming, the compatibilist option does
deliver all the freedom we can have and, thus, all the freedom “worth wanting”
(Dennett, 1984). If you can’t have what you love, love what you have: a
sensible maxim for us finite human beings indeed. As we will try to show,
however, indeterminism can deliver a more sensible notion of attributable
agency than commonly supposed.
So, is the grass all green on the indeterminist’s side of the fence? No,
it isn’t, and in fact the conceptual problems of attributable agency under
indeterminism are seen by many philosophers to be insurmountable. This
brings us to the second horn of the dilemma. In a nutshell, the problem is that
if given s at ts, the occurrence of e at te isn’t determined, then it seems emust
be a chance happening—and what is due to chance, isn’t due to the agent.
This challenge is presented in a number of different forms, and has recently
been the focus of increased attention.6 In one form, explicitly directed at
human intentional agency as involving (perhaps conscious) reasons for acting,
the challenge is known as the “luck objection”: If α brings about e, but could
have brought about f instead, then indeterminism means that there can have
been no sufficient reason for α to choose e instead of f . Thus, unless α meant
to let itself be directed by randomness, e.g., as a means for tie-breaking,7
this means that the occurrence of e cannot be attributed to α after all: It
seems that α should have, but lacks, a contrastive reasons-explanation for
the occurrence of e. This objection is interesting, but its discussion leads to
the topic of consciously acting for reasons, which is a phenomenon that, like
human free will (if indeed it is different from free will at all), is vastly more
complex than the notion of attributable agency that we wish to tackle in this
paper. At any rate, attributable agency is surely a necessary precondition
for higher forms of agency, and so, any conceptual trouble for attributable
agency is a fortiori a problem for the notion of consciously acting for a reason
as well. At the level of mere attributable agency, the challenge is perhaps best
6See, e.g., Franklin (2011) for a critical discussion of different arguments and for many
references.
7As in flipping a coin to decide whether to have coffee or tea for breakfast. Note that
we would describe such involvement of randomness as part of the agent’s identity.
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expressed by what Van Inwagen (2000) calls the “replay argument”. Assume
that actually, starting with the concrete situation s at time ts (which we may
take to be pretty close to te), e occurred at te, and we wish to attribute e’s
happening to α. Now assume that we replay the course of events starting with
s a number of times—this is of course something we cannot do, but maybe
God could do it, and at least we seem to be able to imagine it coherently.
By assumption, the occurrence of e was not determined, so that among the
n runs in total, there will be a number n+ of runs in which e occurs, and
n− runs in which e fails to occur at te. Thus, there is an objective, ground-
floor probability, roughly equal to n+/n, for e to occur given s. But, so the
argument goes, this shows that the occurrence of e is just a chance happening,
and as such, not due to the agent.
On both horns of the dilemma, it seems, the notion of attributable agency
cannot find a sufficient foothold. In any case in which it makes sense to posit
a self-identical agent at all, such an agent would either be enslaved by a
deterministic course of events that started long before they were born, or it
would be enslaved by random happenings that toss the agent to and fro on
an erratic course. Neither scenario warrants the label “attributable agency”.
Furthermore, the two horns form an exhaustive disjunction: either the world
is fundamentally deterministic, or it isn’t, there cannot be a third way. So
attributable agency, it seems, makes no sense. But this is outrageous. Isn’t
there a way out?
2.2 Indeterminism: friend or foe?
As we said, we see no useful role for a notion of attributable agency under
determinism: Even if such a notion turns out to be tenable, it will not
help us to understand attributable agency in our world, which we know to
be indeterministic.8 So, we need to look more closely at the prospects of
8To clarify: We are not saying that there could not be agents that react deterministically
in certain types of situations, i.e., agents that always show behavior bi in situations of
type sj . What we are claiming is that given the metaphysical assumption of universal
determinism, we can make no sense of attributable agency. Our model of attributable
agency under indeterminism (see §3), on the other hand, does leave room for learning
agents to form deterministic behavior patterns, and can explain these via the development
of an agent’s (learning) history. Maybe to be a morally good person means to react
deterministically (to choose the one good option) in a wide range of morally challenging
situations. We are not claiming that such behavior is impossible, or even strange—we
only claim that such behavior, too, needs to be understood on the basis of underlying
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understanding attributable agency under indeterminism.9
In many discussions of agency, it is acknowledged that objective indeter-
minism opens up a new range of ontological possibilities when compared with
determinism. It is a simple conceptual fact that under indeterminism, the
future is open, while under determinism, it isn’t. In an indeterministic world,
more than one thing can happen. As the replay argument shows, there is
however also reason for skepticism as to the consequences that indeterminism
has for agency and control. Can there even be a stable, let alone a reliable
agent in an indeterministic world?
This question takes indeterminism as a threat for reliability. And surely
there is some truth to that. Put bluntly, how can there even be reliable mech-
anisms in an indeterministic world? Well, our world is indeterministic, and
it contains reliable mechanisms. Biological cells are perfect examples of the
successful harnessing of indeterminism in the interest of a functioning whole.
The building blocks for protein synthesis move randomly through a cell’s inte-
rior, but protein synthesis is a very efficient process. Ion channels in a cell’s
membrane behave stochastically, but the polarization or depolarization of
cells is an efficient means of signal transmission. These are examples—there
are many more—of the successful (even though not exceptionless) harnessing
of indeterminism, of counteracting an erratic micro-dynamics at some higher
level of functional organization.
Is that all that we can say about indeterminism: It is there, but it can be
overcome by error correction—by clever design in the interest of deterministic
mechanisms? That would stress a generally negative outlook on indetermin-
ism, and not suggest that indeterminism can play any useful role in agency.
Maybe it is what nature has to deal with, fundamentally, but luckily it can
be corrected for?
In fact, at higher levels of organization indeterminism can play out some
real strengths. An animal can have a competitive edge over a predator if it
indeterminism leaving room for learning and development.
9Libertarianism—the theory that there is free will in an indeterministic setting—is often
held to rely on the following argument: (a) It can be established on conceptual grounds that
free will is incompatible with determinism; (b) free will exists; therefore (c) determinism
is false. Our dialectics is different. We take both the existence of free will and the
incompatibility of free will and determinism as defeasible starting points for investigation.
Our main claim is that we have excellent reasons for a belief in indeterminism. This fact
leaves room, but by no means already establishes a useful notion of free will, or at least
of attributable agency, under indeterminism. Our aim is to describe a way in which this
room could be filled.
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does not behave fully predictably, but rather has some random element in
its avoidance behavior.10 Such truly erratic behavior is most probably not
implemented by simulated randomness—building a deterministic mechanism
that behaves almost indeterministically, like a computer’s pseudo-random-
number generator—but by the real randomness in nature that is present as
a raw resource.11
Is there a useful role for indeterminism at the higher level of attributable
agency, apart from the purposive use of randomness for tie-breaking? We
already said that attributing the use of randomness to an agent seems quite
uncontroversial. But can we also attribute to it an individual event that is
the concrete outcome of a random process? Is that ever warranted? Or is
randomness just a threat at that level, without a positive role?
Much here depends on the underlying assumptions about understandable,
attributable agency. A standard model of rational agency (a subcase of at-
tributable agency) looks as follows:12 Based on its beliefs about the world,
an agent generates a number of options for action, by some computational
process. These options are then weighed, e.g., by their expected payoff ac-
cording to some metric that takes into consideration the agent’s desires or
preferences, yielding (at least according to many models) values that are pair-
wise comparable (e.g., real-valued expected utilities). Then the best option is
selected and executed. This is a deterministic algorithm. The only role that
randomness can usefully play, except perhaps at the first stage (where, e.g.,
some random sampling of the space of options may be necessary if the agent
would otherwise create too many options), is for tie-breaking in the case in
which two or more options are assigned the same weight (or, assuming only
partially ordered weights, when different maximal weights are incomparable).
Any other use of randomness in option-selection on this model will lead to
suboptimal performance, since sometimes, options will be selected for which
the agent has a strictly better alternative. How could that help rationality?
Well, if that is what rationality is, then it couldn’t; but it isn’t. The
agent model just described is certainly useful for some applications, and can
10See the overview article by Brembs (2011), who cites, e.g., the escape behavior of
cockroaches (Domenici et al., 2008).
11Of course, to decide this question is a task for physics and biology, not for philosophy.
For some relevant case studies, see Domenici et al. (2011).
12This so-called BDI (belief-desire-intention) model for agency, which is very widespread
in AI, fits nicely with the causal theory of action proposed by Davidson (1963), which is
the mainstream theory of action nowadays.
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lead to sensible results. But it is quite implausible to assume that we are like
that, and the model we are proposing is not of this kind either.
3 Projective simulation: a model for attributable
agency
In this section, we will introduce the model of projective simulation that uses
indeterminism as a resource in such a way that, as we claim, the concrete
outcome of a random process can be sensibly attributed to an agent.
3.1 Randomness as a resource
Randomness is a much-wanted resource in modern society and technology. It
is e.g. used in computer simulations of various processes in biology, ecology
and economy, and it also forms the basis of modern data encryption and
communication systems.
The question, to what extent the sources underlying these applications
can be certified as truly random, is the subject of considerable attention and
of high practical relevance. For example, while so-called pseudo-random num-
ber generators may be sufficient for many applications, they are considered
completely insecure for cryptographic applications that need to guarantee
the privacy and security of a communication channel. On the other hand,
truly random events can be generated by exploiting fundamental physical
processes such as the radioactive decay of a nucleus or the passage of sin-
gle photons through a beam splitter. Quantum random number generators
based on similar processes have been developed and are being used today.
The fact that such applications exist shows that some of the empirical
agents (i.e., humans), whose nature is the topic of our investigation, are not
only exposed to randomness in their daily life, but they even exploit it as part
of their agency. This implies that even a compatibilist approach (advocating
a deterministic notion of agency) has to account for empirical agents that
integrate random events into their agency, not only without affecting their
rational behavior, but as the very result of their rational reasoning.
The question is thus not whether there is any room for randomness in our
model of the world. The task is to show, on the positive side, how randomness
can be included into a model of a rational agent itself, and what role it plays
regarding the possibility of freedom and attributable agency.
10
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3.2 Projective simulation
From the phenomenology of our own agency, we are familiar with random
distractions in our daily business, be it practical, like having to answer the
phone when we are preparing a meal, or theoretical, when we are thinking
about a problem.
Mental work has an interesting phenomenology of its own. In particular,
creative mental work, like writing a novel, composing music, or struggling
with a mathematical proof, is usually plagued with many distractions. In-
terestingly, many of these distractions are self-generated and seem to occur
without a particular reason, other than a lack of concentration or focus in
following our business.
While remembering the recent birthday party of our son, it returns
to my mind that one of his friends did not come because he had
an accident with the bike and broke his leg . . . both of his parents
work at Wall Street and I am wondering how the family will cope
with the financial crisis . . . who knows how all of this will affect
our pensions and savings . . . scenes from my childhood pop into
my mind, from the days when we used to visit my grandma in
Hungary, every year before she suddenly passed away, this was a
wonderful time . . . I don’t know what our health care will be like
when I am going to retire . . . it was very cute when all of the kids
on the birthday party suddenly formed a circle and started singing
happy birthday . . .
Such apparent “stumbling” through our memories happens not only when
we try to remember things and let our mind drift about, but similar ob-
servations can be made when we contemplate and try to solve a scientific
problem. The main difference lies in the context and the “space” of asso-
ciated thoughts, but the phenomenology is similar. Obviously what we are
describing is nothing but “association” and the capability of our mind to
relate “similar things”. Such association can be rambling and almost acci-
dental, as if our mind were, at times, to enter into a state of random motion.
Usually we would interpret such random motion as a surface phenomenon,
ultimately caused by hidden deterministic processes (possibly unconscious)
or by some external distraction.
But what if such a random walk through our memories was not the result
of some external distraction or of lack of focus? What if it was a constitutive
11
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element of our remembering and thinking?
Random stumbling through memory can indeed have a positive effect. It
allows us to break out of a “line of thought” that may lead to a dead end
or whose end is not well-defined to begin with (like in genuine research).
Clearly, such random associations can only be constructive if they are not
too violent and don’t destroy the overall coherence of our agency—that is,
if at the end there will be a good novel or a finished proof, rather than an
overall state of confusion.
A formal model of agency for which randomness plays indeed a construc-
tive role has been described in Briegel and De las Cuevas (2012). The model
is formulated within the conceptual framework of “artificial agents” (Russell
and Norvig, 2011), which is a modern platform for the study of artificial
intelligence. An artificial agent is equipped with sensors and actuators, with
which it can perceive signals from its environment and act on it. Specific
types of agents are usually defined by their “internal program” which relates
perceptual input to resulting actions. The agent model introduced in Briegel
and De las Cuevas (2012) is based on “projective simulation” (PS), which can
be seen as a novel, non-computational, scheme of information processing for
agents. In the following, we summarize the essential elements of PS; for a
detailed treatment, we refer the reader to the original papers.
Projective simulation is based on a close interplay between the actions of
the agent and a specific type of memory, called episodic and compositional
memory (ECM), whose primary function is to store and reinvoke past expe-
rience. ECM is organized as a network of so-called “clips” c, which are the
basic units of memory. They correspond to fragments of episodic memory,
reminiscent of very short sequences of a movie, or a melody. A call of ECM,
triggered by some perceptual input, leads to a random motion through the
space (network) of clips. Such a random motion generates patchwork-like
episodic sequences, assembled from past experience (see Fig. 1), which in-
fluence the resulting action of the agent, e.g. by screening clips for certain
features. The random motion between different clips is governed by transition
probabilities that are continuously modified under the agent’s experience, for
example by Bayesian updating within some reinforcement scheme.
Central to the concept of the episodic-compositional memory is the pos-
sibility that clips may themselves be randomly created and modified as part
of the simulation process (see Fig. 1). Random clip sequences which are
thereby generated will introduce new, “fictitious” episodes that may never
have happened in the agent’s past. Regardless of the fictitious character of
12















Figure 1: Model of episodic and compositional memory (ECM) as a stochas-
tic network of clips. Perceptual input triggers a random motion through
memory. Clips can be modified and newly created as part of the simulation
process. pij denotes the probability of transition from clip i to clip j. (Figure
adapted from Briegel and De las Cuevas (2012).)
such episodes, however, they can trigger factual action by the same mecha-
nism (e.g., screening and feature detection) as the recalling of “real” episodes.
With the ECM as described, the agent is endowed with a simulation plat-
form to “play with” its past experience, without leading to immediate motor
action. By the process of projective simulation, the agent, triggered by per-
ceptual input, is continuously recalling episodic memory, thereby reshuffling,
mutating, and creating new episodic fragments in the process. This is ef-
fectively used by the agent to simulate conceivable future experience on the
basis of past experience, whereby the notion and range of the conceivable is
defined by the rules of clip composition and variation (Briegel, 2012).
Remarkably, all described transitions within ECM that constitute the
projective simulation are assumed to be random, following only certain prob-
ability distributions. Random processes drive both the transitions between
existing clips and the creation of new clips. The model of projective simu-
lation is thus an intrinsically indeterministic model which uses random pro-
cesses as part of its design.
In contrast to the discussion in §3.1, randomness is here not something
“external”, which the agent is confronted with and which it may need to cor-
rect or otherwise “deal with”. Instead, it is a constitutive part of the agent’s
identity, which changes as the agent learns. This is an important point for
our discussion of attributable agency. Crucially, the episodic and composi-
tional memory (ECM) provides a separate level and a “playground”, which
is detached from the primary sensory and motor level. Given this separate
13
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level, randomness can now be exploited in a constructive way: Whereas ran-
domness that acts on the primary (e.g. motor) level leads to manifest erratic
behavior, it becomes the driving force that creates (a primordial notion of)
options13 when acting on the memory level (Briegel, 2012).
It should be noted that for the phenomenology of behavior of the agent
(e.g., regarding its learning efficiency), the ultimate nature of the random
processes that generate the clip transitions (as described by the probabili-
ties pij in Fig. 1) is not important. If these probabilities are not generated
by genuinely indeterministic processes (as in quantum physics) but, say, by
some pseudo-random number generator, the agent will show similar behav-
ior in most situations.14 In this sense, we have something to offer to the
deterministic compatibilist as well: In a deterministic world (a world un-
like ours), it may be possible to make sense of attributable agency if an
agent contains reliable sources of apparent randomness. The main point is
that at the level of functional organization that explains the dynamics of
ECM in the model, the pij clip-to-clip transition probabilities are “ground
floor” probabilities that are not analyzed any further. In fact, assuming that
pseudo-randomness is used (as in simulations of ECM on a standard com-
puter), the added deterministic layer does not enhance our understanding
of what the agent does—rather, such a deterministic background would be
only accidentally related to the agent’s dynamical development, while the
indeterministic random walk through clip space is constitutive of the agent’s
development, and in this sense, not accidental. Note that via the model
of projective simulation, we have turned the table against the deterministic
compatibilist. It is not that we model an agent as a deterministic system
that can probably tolerate some randomness—rather, we model an agent as
an indeterministic system that can probably tolerate some determinism. It
is therefore clear that indeterminism is not a threat to the model, but a
resource for attributable agency.
13It should be clear that the notion of “option” as described is of course a very primitive
one. Since the model of PS does not assume any form of consciousness, the agent will not
make any conscious choice. Here, “option” rather refers to the very existence of alternatives,
within ECM, which the agent can explore (and possibly evaluate) via simulation, before
it takes (i.e., runs into) real action.
14It is, however, an interesting question, how one would design a “Turing test” that
allows, in principle, an external observer to distinguish PS agents based on pseudo-
randomness from PS agents based on true randomness.
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4 Discussion
Having introduced the model of projective simulation in §3, what can we say
about the conceptual problems of attribution in an indeterministic setting
laid out in §2? Does the model succeed in laying the worries to rest? The
model arguably has a good chance of capturing the dynamical nature of
human action selection—but can it counter the charge of erratic randomness
for single outcomes of that process?
4.1 On the indeterminism of projective simulation
The model is thoroughly indeterministic. The agent’s action following some
sensory input, comes about through a process that is doubly stochastic, in-
volving both a random walk through the agent’s memory and the stochas-
tically driven addition of additional “virtual” memory episodes. If an agent
implementing the model were to face the same situation again, such as as-
sumed in the replay argument (same perceptual input while being in the
same internal state), its action could be different from the action it in fact
showed—but it could also be the same. Also, depending on the concrete
state of the agent’s memory, the set of actions that could possibly ensue
given that situation, can be limited to a small subset of the agent’s full be-
havioral repertoire (even just a single option, as discussed in note 8), or it
can, in the other limiting case, be any action in that repertoire.
The agent’s memory organization will for all practical purposes guarantee
that the agent will never be in the same situation twice: its internal state
keeps track of its history. This makes it sensible to think of the agent’s
identity as developing historically, and that identity plays a crucial (yet not
deterministic) role in its behavior when facing a certain situation.
According to the model of projective simulation, an agent is not “small” in
the sense criticized vehemently by, e.g., Dennett (2003): The model describes
the agent’s internal organization at a level of detail that, while only referring
to simple physical vocabulary, makes understandable what happens when
the agent acts. But the agent is, in its constitution, not deterministic, but
deeply indeterministic. That indeterminism is naturalistically motivated and
is used as a resource that makes a degree of flexibility possible that seems
implausible, if not impossible, to achieve in a deterministic setting.
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4.2 Revisiting the replay argument
In order to see whether the model can counter the charge of erratic random-
ness, let us confront it with the replay argument. The challenge, as described
in §2.1, is the following. Consider the real situation s at time ts < te, and
a real event e at te that we wish to attribute to our agent α. We assume
that the agent is suitably described by the model of projective simulation.
Since that model is indeterministic, the situation s at ts does not normally
determine or guarantee the occurrence of e at te.15 Now, consider a large
number n of hypothetical replays starting with s at ts. In a number n+ of
these, e occurs; in n− = n−n+ of the runs, e fails to occur. The rhetorics of
the replay argument urges us to view the actual transition from ts to te as
a chance event whose objective chance of leading to event e we can estimate
to be n+/n. If that is what happened—a chance process occurred and forced
the agent into one of its possible outcomes—then the agent had no role in
it, the agent didn’t make a difference to what happens, and attribution is
impossible.16 A story to the effect that it may be evolutionarily beneficial for
the agent to let itself be enslaved by such chance happenings in certain situ-
ations (e.g., when determining the direction in which to flee from a predator,
or in tie-breaking), may ground some weak notion of attribution, but what
we can attribute there is not the concrete outcome (e happening), but only
the general fact that a chancy happening occurs that involves the agent’s
body and which plays some functional role for the agent.
This is not what we are looking for, and not enough to lay the replay
argument to rest. What is demanded to meet that challenge, is an attribution
of the actual outcome, in the actual course of events, in which indeterminism
was not employed for tie-breaking. How can it be that the actual occurrence
of the undetermined event e is due to the agent? Does projective simulation
really change the game in that respect?
We claim that it does. The redescription of what happened as a single
chance happening between times ts and te in some sense amounts to deleting
the agent from the story. But the model of projective simulation gives a
15As laid out above, an agent may arrive at deterministic (0 or 1) transition probabilities
in its ECM, based on some specific learning history. This is a limiting case in which
the challenge of the replay argument vanishes automatically. Here, however, we have to
formulate a general reply that also works for non-extremal transition probabilities.
16As noted in §2.1, this does not mean that the agent’s body wasn’t causally involved
in bringing about e; that may well be so. What is crucial is that as described, α does not
control what happens.
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detailed account of the process going on within the agent that actually led
from s to e: The agent is not a mere point, a mere label that we want to attach
to the chance transition, but an extended being within which a chance process
consisting of many steps is going on. This process affords understanding of
the transition from s to e. Each of the steps in the actual random walk
occurring in the agent’s memory that actually led to the occurrence of e,
is individually a happening that plays a functional role for the agent as a
persisting being. While these steps are undetermined, their occurrence is not
an accident.
If we want to posit the question of attributability fairly, as an open ques-
tion that could at least in principle receive a positive answer in some cases, we
cannot drop the agent, its history and its identity from the picture. The pro-
cess going on within the agent adds to that agent’s identity, it builds forth on
the agent’s history in a sensible way. If we describe the happening that actu-
ally led to e’s occurrence within the model of projective simulation, we have
to agree that we cannot account for the individual chance processes happen-
ing as the individual steps in the random walk through the agent’s memory
space—we cannot offer a contrastive explanation why this step, rather than
that one, took place.17 Each of these is what it is: a random event. But each
of them also happens within a larger environment that fixes its role in the
agent’s developing history.
As we said in the description of the model, an agent engaged in projective
simulation builds forth on its identity (its dynamically expanding and con-
stantly updated memory). It has a history, which explains its current behav-
ioral dispositions, which in the model are reflected by the internal transition
probabilities between its memory-clips. These probabilities, which guide the
random walk through clip space that leads to a concrete but undetermined
action of the agent, are not an accident—they are the concrete trace of the
agent’s history, of what it did and what that resulted in. And similarly, the
individual steps in the random walk are not an accident either: They are the
situated results of the agent’s historical development.
But isn’t there still a problem? What is wrong with the one-step descrip-
tion? In the model, each of the admittedly many steps leading from s to e
17Since there are well-defined transition probabilities for these steps, we can cite these
probabilities to underline to what extent the actual step was possible. But note that even
in case that probability is very low, the step can just occur. It is a mistake to think that
quoting a probability can give a contrastive explanation of why one rather than another
step occurred.
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has a concrete transition probability attached to it. Can’t we simply unravel
the whole historical development, multiplying probabilities along the way
(assuming, in the simplest case, a Markovian dynamics for the clip-to-clip
transitions) and adding alternative paths that lead to e? Doesn’t this fix an
objective probability for the occurrence of e given s, just as the replay argu-
ment claims? And doesn’t this show that we are thereby warranted in giving
the agent-less description of what happens that shows that attributability is
just a fluke, a manner of speaking that is ultimately not warranted?
In the simplest version of the agent, in which there is a discrete succes-
sion of percepts (input) and actions (output), it is true that we can give an
“effective representation” of the agent’s behavioral disposition as a matrix
of transition probabilities from the possible inputs to the possible outputs.
At that level of coarse-graining, it is true that the projective simulation
agent’s mapping of inputs to outputs is a random process with fixed prob-
abilities. But these probabilities are themselves the result of the agent’s
(learning) history. Typically, under compelling circumstances, the agent will
almost certainly do what is necessary (in the setting of reinforcement learn-
ing: choose the unique action that is highly rewarded / not punished), while
in situations where its actions make no crucial difference (constant reward),
the agent’s choice may indeed remain random. It is important to realize that
this possibility does not affect the integrity of the agent.18 In summary, we
can typically expect an agent, after some feedback from interactions with its
environment, to have built up some rather fixed patterns of reaction to some
stimuli. But such behavior does not have to be deterministic. We mentioned
that indeterminism can have an advantage already for very simple scenarios.
We may assume that flexibility is generally beneficial. What reason do we
have for not attributing the concrete reaction of a flexible agent to a con-
crete percept, to the agent itself? The agent is not enslaved by some dubious
external source of randomness leading to erratic behavior—rather, it shows
flexible behavior of a form that can be explained, and understood, in terms
of its past actions and experiences. The randomness inherent in the process
does not change this—and in fact, the result of the action chosen according
18We do not think that an agent’s integrity would be threatened if, say, its choice for
vanilla vs. chocolate ice cream in a given situation is completely random. Each such
choice is still the agent’s, and via external feedback will contribute to its development.
Attributability stays intact, no matter whether an explicit use of external randomness is
involved (flipping a coin) or the choice is due to the indeterministic constitution of the
agent.
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to the agent’s current memory state will lead to further development of the
agent’s identity.
This is one component of our rebuttal of the charge of randomness: It
makes sense. A second component comes from looking at what is really
happening when the agent acts. It is true that in the simplest cases, we can
give a summary description of the agent’s effective input-output behavior in
terms of a matrix of transition probabilities. But this is not the level of the
actually occurring processes. It is not the case that, parallel to the case of
the BDI agent described above, the agent somehow computes its effective
transition probabilities and then tosses a coin, or the appropriate number
of coins, in order to determine an action to be executed. That would be
an agent that subjects itself to an outside source of randomness, and we
can agree that there is something fishy about attributing the outcome of the
coin-toss to the agent. Such use of external randomness seems only to be
understandable as due to the agent if it is used for simple tie-breaking (we
may flip a coin to tell Buridan’s ass which haystack to choose)—but that
is not our situation. What is really going on is different. The matrix of
input-to-output transition probabilities describes the agent from an external
perspective that leaves out the crucial dynamics of the agent’s use of its
memory (and thus, its history). That dynamics is stochastic as well, to be
sure: a random walk through clip space. Each single random transition from
one clip to another, however, is understandable from the internal perspective
of the agent’s history. That level of description does justice to the actually
occurring, objectively random processes of clip-to-clip transition. There is
simply no random process, really, that leads from a percept to an action in one
direct leap. Focusing on the real dynamics furthermore brings the dynamical
nature of the agent’s memory back into view. As we said in describing the
model, the set of clips in the agent’s memory isn’t fixed—new clips can be
added via variations of existing memory content. In that way, the agent adds
“conceivable happenings” to its simulation repertoire (“what else could have
happened?”). This leads to the expansion of the agent’s range of possibilities.
The summary description hides this element of the model, which is however
crucial to the agent’s creativity, i.e., its capability of creating—by itself—new
options for its subsequent actions.
A third component in rebutting the charge of erratic randomness, comes
from taking seriously the fact that the agent is an open system that is in
continuous interaction with its environment (which leads beyond the simplest
model of projective simulation). In the actual course of events, which led to e,
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we can take the actual situation at each concrete simulation step into account,
and the model indeed assigns objective probabilities to these situated steps.
There is no guarantee, however, that we can assign meaningful transition
probabilities in a hypothetical replay unless the whole state of the universe
is described in addition. Maybe in one such replay a cosmic ray hits the
agent and alters the transition probabilities. In an indeterministic world—
the world we live in—the fact that no such ray hit the agent, gives us no
reason to exclude it from a hypothetical replay. Unless, that is, we mean
by a replay, a mere repetition of what actually happened. But that will be
uninteresting, and will not give any support to the replay argument as an
argument against attribution.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we discussed a necessary precondition of human free will, which
plays a role in animal agency as well: the notion of attributable agency. We
showed that even this—rather simple—notion is subject to a dilemma that
threatens its coherence: It seems that we cannot attribute agency under de-
terminism (the agent cannot make a difference to what happens, as that was
fixed long before its birth), nor under indeterminism (the agent cannot make
a difference to what happens, since that is due to chance). We claim that
putting the issue in these rather simple and non-committal terms, avoiding
issues of practical wisdom and morality, is also helpful for the broader free
will discussion, as it avoids running together considerations at different levels.
In a next step, we discussed the notion of indeterminism. While indeter-
minism is often seen as a threat to stable behavior, we showed that in many
instances, indeterminism can be your friend. The image of indeterminism
as pure erratic chance does not correspond to what we know about nature’s
indeterminism (as exhibited, e.g., at the quantum level): Natural indeter-
minism is not a matter of “anything goes”, but the random actualization of
one of a limited number of determinate possibilities. The threat of random-
ness is therefore often misguided. Still this does not yet amount to a positive
model of attributable agency under indeterminism.
In §3 we described a model that, as we claim, succeeds at this positive
task and describes attributable agency under indeterminism. The model,
which originates in AI research by one of the authors (Briegel and De las
Cuevas, 2012; Briegel, 2012), is built around a specific memory architecture
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that the agent employs in an associative fashion in order to “stumble”, via a
random walk, from a given percept to some action. While the whole process is
thoroughly stochastic, and no contrastive explanations of the individual steps
as against alternative steps are available, the whole process can be understood
as due to the agent. Crucially, this is not just because we may choose to adopt
a certain stance towards the agent such that agency vocabulary becomes
appropriate, but because what is happening, is part of the agent’s developing
identity. The randomness driving the model is not an outside threat to the
agent, but a constitutive, functionally central element of its organization.
We discussed the model of projective simulation and its interpretation in
§4, revisiting the replay argument against indeterminism-based attributable
agency in detail. We claim that by presenting the model, we are able to
successfully rebut the replay argument. We gave three main reasons: (1)
The PS agent is not point-like. Our model treats an agent as a real thing
with internal structure—its ECM—and not as a mere point-like label on a
transition process. A replay must be allowed to affect the agent’s identity.
(2) The PS agent acts rationally. The agent’s behavior, while stochastically
driven, is not erratic, but makes sense. The agent’s ECM, encoding its past
learning history and self-generated behavioral options and patterns, gives rise
to agency that can be understood and attributed at the level of individual
actions. (3) Finally, we remarked that the notion of a replay is not well-
defined for real agents, who are open systems continuously interacting with
their environments. Note that we have not just voiced counterarguments,
but provided a positive instance of that which the replay argument suggests
cannot exist. This shows that the argument is unsuccessful.
If we are right, we have shown that attributable agency is possible in a
fundamentally indeterministic setting, and we have given a concrete model
of how that is possible. Let us hasten to add that we do not claim hereby to
have deduced the inner workings of the human brain (that is an empirical task
that we leave to the experts), nor to have explained libertarian human free
will in all of its complexity and moral significance. We do claim, however, to
have opened up a significant route towards understanding free will as based
on attributable agency. Our world is indeterministic, and if we are agents,
we are agents on that natural basis. Understanding this in detail is certainly
hard—but it is not a mystery. Given a concrete model for attributable agency
under indeterminism, a blanket rejection of libertarianism is no longer a
serious option.
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